Support for the Mullah was not by any means universal. Some tribes remained loyal to the British and others were alienated from his cause by his cruelty or simply because the promised plunder did not materialise. These latter defected. His greatest support came from the Doldbahanta, his own tribe. The British commander was a dashing chap called Lieutenant Colonel EJE Swayne who had previously been on safari in Somaliland hunting elephant, rhino, kudu and buffalo. He brought with him an enterprising Somali called Musa Farah who rose from a boot black to wealth and power, giving valuable service and receiving a sword of honour from King Edward VII. He began his task of dealing with the situation by raising a new properly equipped and trained Somali Levy. By February 1901 he had raised a camel corps of 100 men and an infantry force of 954 men of whom 160 were mounted on ponies. This latter force was under strength as the friendly tribes were unwilling to allow their best horsemen to join the Levy.
Before
the tribes could be concentrated at the grazing pastures near Burao for their
own protection the Mullah struck on 13 February at Bale Shele Shale, 43 miles to
the south. Men, women and children
were slaughtered and their live stock driven off.
Although the Levies marched immediately they could not catch the camel
mounted raiders though they did inflict some losses
and recovered most of the sheep.
Having consumed all the water that they had in their tins the Levy had to
return from the waterless Haud.
The bulk of the infantry had, on the 13th, covered
some 53 miles, carrying 100 rounds of ammunition, 2 days rations and 2 days
water. On top of this they had just
returned from a 12 mile march to reach Burao before being despatched.
Thus the main body covered about 65 miles, the advance parties another 10
and the mounted troops a further 14 miles.
It can be seen that the predominantly infantry force had done all it
could and reached the limits of endurance.
Only a fully mounted force could have prevented the Mullah from escaping
with the precious camels and sheep that the people depended upon for milk and
food.
Meanwhile, 100 miles to the east, another Dervish raid fell
upon the Jama Siad friendly tribes.
Here again they suffered terribly.
Burao and Berbera became filled with the destitute tribesmen.
2,000 a day were being fed daily at Burao alone.
The Mullah’s raiding operations were based at a large
standing camp at Bur Dab. His
intention was to continue raiding the largely unarmed tribes until they were
destitute and forced through hunger to join him.
So he despatched raiding parties to the east of Berbera in the lands of
the Ishak tribesmen. These raids
exerted considerable pressure upon the tribal leaders to go over to the Mullah
and thus open the way to Berbera.
The political implications of the defection of the Ishak tribes would be the
destabilisation of eastern Somaliland.
The military necessity of containing the Mullah south of
Berbera until he could be dealt with had to be continued while politically
motivated operations were mounted to counter the raiding parties in the east and
to stop disaffection amongst the friendly tribes in that area.
Levies were concentrated at Burao and the operation interrupted when 700
men were despatched south of the Waggar Mountains to deal with a raid there.
The Dervishes withdrew when they faced this opposition.
On 13th May the operations resumed and 700 men
under Lt Col Swale through Las Doorie to the mountains behind Heis.
They took the Dervishes by surprise in three locations, inflicting heavy
casualties and scattering the survivors to the four winds.
All of the livestock that had been stolen was recovered and 70 horses
belonging to the raiders were captured.
The Ishak tribes who had begun negotiations with the Mullah had to pay a
fine and assist in bringing in the Mullah’s ambassadors.
In order to keep the Mullah’s attention away from the eastern
area a reconnaissance in force was mounted from Burao together with tribal
irregulars who were sent out to threaten the Mullah’s flocks and herds towards
Kurmis to the south west and eastwards to Bur Anod.
He was very effectively distracted and the force returned with large
numbers of livestock. The Ishak
tribesmen seeing the Mullah’s forces lose face returned and were, from then,
steadfastly opposed the Mullah. The
Mullah’s attempts to subvert this region had failed.
In carrying out their mission the Levy had carried out forced
marches of over 40 miles a day, climbed mountains that rose to 7,000 feet,
traversed deep valleys between and covered over 420 miles.
The troops were fed on sheep and camels that accompanied the force while
the needs of the British were provided on a few pack camels.
Along the coast the Royal Navy co-operated in the form of HMS Cossack so
that Heis could be opened as a Customs port.
This port further secured the loyalty of the Dolbahanta tribesmen and
even returned a profit of £600 in its first year after all expenses for
administration had been deducted.
The success was measured by Lt Col Swayne when the Warsangli Sultan, who had
never before entered Berbera, came in and agreed to keep out the Mullah’s
emissaries.
Whilst these eastern operations were taking place along with
the diversionary operations in front of the Mullah the preparations for the main
effort were being made at Burao.
The Mullah main forces were now at Kirrit and Bohotle.
It was estimated that he had a following of 7,000 horsemen of whom 1,500
had rifles and 7,000 infantry who were mainly spearmen.
However, the Dervishes offered the British no target for an attack, they
held no city, no fort, no land.
Thus there was no tangible military objective upon which to fix them.
Rissaldar Major Musa Farah had also been busy assembling a
force of 5,000 tribesmen in the western part of the protectorate.
He crossed into the Haud at the head of his tribesmen to attack the
western encampments of the Mullah’s followers and prevent them from moving
southwest. He had a novel way of
acquiring the 2,000 baggage camels that he needed.
To just buy them would have forced prices up so he persuaded the tribes
to lend the camels on the basis that repayment would be made from any livestock
captured from the enemy.
On 26 May the bulk of the infantry marched out from Burao and
by marching 67 miles in 2½ days marching they arrived at Wadamago.
The Mullah’s scouts and advanced partes retired to Lasa-Dar and Bohotle.
The concentration of forces was completed there.
Strong fighting patrols drove in the Mullah’s outposts in the direction
of Lasa-Gar while the main body advanced on the Mullah’s forces at Jilib, near
Bohotle. This was the left of the
Mullah’s positions. Meanwhile
Rissaldar Major Musa Farah was ordered to bring his tribesmen wide around the
left of the Mullah’s forces to concentrate with the main force at Bohotle after
driving in the enemy’s left rear.
The plug in the operation was a difficult one to achieve.
It was important to prevent the Mullah from escaping to Mudug in Italian
Somaliland. Attempt were made to
induce Yusuf Ali, a friendly Mijjarten Chief under Italian protection, to occupy
the wells there in force.
Unfortunately, he did not leave Aden and left only a weak garrison in a fort at
Galkayu in the southern part of the oasis.
The supply dump at Samala was defended by 370 rifle armed
infantry, 70 spearmen, a handful of horsemen and a Maxim gun commanded by
Captain M McNeil of the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders was attacked by a force of 5,000 Somali Dervishes with
about 80 riflemen. In a two day
action in which the Dervishes made repeated rushes and attempts at infiltration,
McNeil’s men inflicted several hundred casualties in return for 9 killed and 9
wounded one of whom later died of his wounds.
In retaliation for the attack at Samala, Swayne made a night
march against a Dervish camp at Erigo with a column of 75 cavalry, 500 infantry
16 camels carrying 4 Maxims, water and supplies.
At dawn the column reached a bush filled valley.
Concealed within the cover, Dervish riflemen directed heavy fire against
the mounted men who formed the advance guard.
Swayne fell back into the open to form square from where his rifles and
Maxims would be most effective.
The Mullah, knowing the effect of massed rifle and Maxim fire, would not
be drawn into the open and withdrew deeper into the scrub.
The advancing Levies were faced by groups of Dervishes who
fell back in front of them through Bohotle to Damo while on the right they also
fell back skirmishing while maintaining contact with the left at Damo.
At the same time he detached a mounted force to Halin in eastern Nogal to
raid the Bohotle – Burao line of communications.
The Levies took Bohotle on 4 June with strong patrols continuing the
pursuit and maintaining contact with the enemy while the main body halted long
enough to build a stone fort and join up with Rissaldar Major Musah Farah’s
tribesmen. From here a detachment
was sent out on 7 June to meet the tribesmen and on 10 June the main body,
leaving a garrison at the wells, marched out.
Musah Farrah’s tribesmen met the force on 11 June 20 miles
south of Bohotle. The Rissaldar
Major’s force had been completely successful.
They had driven in the encampments inflicting casualties and capturing
1,630 camels, 200 cows and 2,000 sheep.
As the force returned to Bohotle for water news came in that a native
caravan with some Government camels had been attacked on the Line of
Communication by a mounted Dervish force.
Parties sent to the scene brought in some of the baggage and some wounded
men.
After despatching strong
patrols to secure the line of communication from these mounted raiders the main
column resumed its march on Damo.
The Dervish horsemen were driven off on 18 June and the pursuit continued for 2
days into the Haud. However, the
water supplies at Damo were insufficient to maintain the force and fill the
water tins. The information to hand
was that the Mullah with most of his remaining forces had already passed through
Erigo to the Mudug Oasis while a force had swung around to the north and
re-entered the Protectorate in eastern Nogal.
Swayne decided to attack the northern force while the remainder secured
sufficient camels and water vessels to allow the whole force to advance on the
Mullah at Mudug.
On 20 June with little water left they entered Las Anod and
refilled their water supplies. In a
series of spirited actions over the next few days he pursued the raiders.
Lt Col Cobbe was detached with the mounted corps supported by spearmen to
attack the Mullah’s camps at night.
He covered over 35 miles a day in pursuit inflicting losses on the enemy and
caught up with them at Yiwehil.
Here his force killed 150 men and captured 3,900 camels and 12,000 sheep.
In these actions he lost 7 men killed and one severely wounded.
A caravan carrying rifles for the Mullah narrowly escaped
with one camel being captured. Next
day a detachment of 3 companies led by Major Phillips ambushed another caravan
coming up from Mudug. The Dervishes
lost 25 men and 455 camels and 5,000 sheep were captured.
The prisoners said that the Mullah was having difficulty maintaining his
force at Mudug because of a lack of grazing and water and so he was being forced
to send sizeable parties up to the Nogal.
Unfortunately Yusuf Ali’s forces were not strong enough to intervene.
They also told that caravans of arms were reaching the Mullah and that a
number of tribesmen who were hostile to Yusuf Ali had joined the Mullah bringing
their rifles.
The Nogal Valley seemed to be the focus of the Mullah’s
efforts and so the line of communication was reinforced and further operations
planned. The Mijjarten tribesmen
were warned about supporting the Mullah but they ignored the warnings.
They also allowed caravans of rifles to pass through their territory.
These rifles were very important as the Royal Navy had cut off the supply
line through the Warsangli ports with their own warships and two armed dhows
purchased for the purpose. The
Nogal was very dry and the tribes coming up from Mudug, the Nur Ahmed and the
Hassan Urghaz, were driven back into Italian territory suffering considerable
casualties and losing 2,000 camels and 20,000 sheep.
Hadi Sudi escaped with the cattle and was brought to battle on the high
waterless Aya Plateau. Some 1,600
camels and 15,000 sheep were captured and the raiders virtually wiped out.
The few survivors fled northwards.
The rapid pursuit, forced marches harsh terrain and the lack of water had
cost the pursuers over 1,000 camels but the deficiency was made up from the
captured stock. Not only that 10
men died and 150 had to be carried on camels because of poor water at Kalis.
Caught on the move the Nur Ahmed and Naleya Ahmed were
attacked on the high waterless Sorl Plain.
Again much livestock was captured and over 300 killed.
The Dervish fort at Halin was destroyed.
By 31 July the camp held 12,000 camels, 35,000 sheep and 600 cattle,
exclusive of the 2,000 transport camels of the column and 1,000 captured camels
used to replace losses and 1,500 camels and 15,000 sheep in rations.
Many detachments were sent out to intercept the Mullah’s
tribesmen driven out of the Mudug by lack of water.
Caravans of arms were captured or driven back. These detachments drove
the Mullah’s followers out of the Nogal with heavy loss trapping many against
the sea. Even the Mijjarten, so
long recalcitrant, came in to sue for peace.
On 24 August a sizeable section of the mullah’s followers including 200
riflemen were attacked on the Sorl Plain.
In the action over 200 Dervish were killed and 1,450 camels, 437 cattle,
30 horses and 1,000 sheep were captured as was a caravan containing 29 French
rifles with1,000 rounds of ammunition.
The 200 riflemen shot wildly and inflicted only 14 casualties.
Thus with the Nogal cleared and his line of communications Swayne turned
his attention southwards and the organisation of a large water caravan.
Meanwhile the Mullah’s tribesmen still attempted to reach grazing in the
north and the Alligherri, Khaiyat, Ba Ararsama as well as others were driven
back into the Haud by columns operating from Beretable in the east to De-Jeuno
in the west. At the same time the
tribes on the road south from Bohotle were also driven back.
Once again casualties were inflicted and numbers of camels, sheep and
horses captured.
News came that Yusuf Ali’s small garrison had, as expected,
been killed or captured when the fort fell.
This allowed him to make use of the water and grazing in the southern
part of the Mudug and start to rebuild his scattered forces.
Thus he found some relief from the problems that were causing his
disorganised force from disintegrating completely.
The scouts and Levy columns were capturing prisoners who told that the
forces with the Mullah were reduced to 1,200 horsemen and 6,000 spearmen and
though many ponies had died he still had 9,000 left.
He was reported to be at Galkayu.
His pursuers also had difficulties caused by the lack of water.
These
actions brought home the fact that the courage and fanaticism of the Dervish was
every bit as great as it had been under the Mahdi in the 1880s and the Khalifa
Abdullah a few years before. This
gave Swayne and his superiors considerable cause for concern.
On the other hand it also showed that the new Somali Levy was a reliable
and solid fighting force. During
this expedition the Dervishes sustained some 1,400 casualties, lost a large
number of prisoners and some 25,000 camels, in addition to many sheep, cattle,
and horses. But disorganized transport and the falling morale of the Somali
levies prevented the pursuit of the Mullah to his retreat in the Mudug
district.