British Operations Against The mad mullah
A wargamer's Guide
1919 - 1920 – The Fifth Expedition
The return of the Warrior Mullah to major raiding gained
Westminster government’s attention and in October 1919 they authorised a further
campaign. Current intelligence
indicated that he was at Medishe and Jidali (not to be confused with Jidbali) in
the north west of British Somaliland.
The plan called for an innovative approach that with its relative
cheapness attracted Treasury approval.
An important feature of the projected campaign was the operational
security (secrecy) that was attached to the arrival of the air component at
Berbera. The story was put out that
the long awaited oil boring operations were about to begin.
So it was that the arrival of the RAF personnel and equipment was
associated with these fictitious operations without raising any suspicions.
The plan called for a carefully
co-ordinated attack involving land, sea and air components.
The land component’s Force A (the Camel Corps and a wing of the 101
Grenadiers) was to be deployed at Eil Dur Elan
in the north, with Force B (King’s African Rifles) at Las Koreh and was
to cut the Dervishes off from their escape to Italian Somaliland and capture the
Dervish fort at Baran. The
sea component provided by HMS Clio and HMS Odin was to capture the fort at
Galliabur which would deprive the Mullah of his last access to the Gulf of Aden.
Three thousand tribal levies were in the south to prevent the Mullah’s
escape in that direction. The Air
component, Force Z with its light bombers based at Eil Dur Elan.
The overall plan was to drive the Mullah north into Force A or west into
hostile Abyssinian territory. The
logistic effort was not neglected and supplies were acquired locally as before.
In addition remounts and other equipment including Stokes mortars,
ammunition, additional water tanks and other equipment was purchased from Egypt,
Aden, India and elsewhere. The
forward supply dump was established at Las Dureh where enough supplies to last
the entire force 3 months were stockpiled.
Major H Rayne MC was appointed chief supply and transport
officer. He set about forming new
companies of the Somali Camel Corps and 42 supply companies each of 120 camels.
This was no mean task as the region had been depleted of 10,000 baggage
camels in 1917 and 1918 to supply the needs of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
Particular attention was paid to the medical provision for the Levy and
the locally recruited drivers and followers.
Once the logistic preparations were well advanced a signal was sent for
the aircraft to be sent up from Alexandria on HMS Ark Royal.
The concentration of Force Z was completed on 17 January 1920.
On 20 January 1920 a lone DH9A carried out a leaflet dropping
raid on the Mullah’s Haroun at
Medishe. The leaflets warned him
that the “arm of the government is long” and advising that he and his followers
should surrender. The Somali
response was clear, they fired at the aeroplane.
The campaign opened the next day when six DH9As took off in
the early morning to bomb Jidali and Medishe.
They became separated and only one found Medishe.
Four of the others reached Jidali and bombed the fort there.
The issued maps were of no help with all their errors. The single DH9A
that reached Medishe dropped eight 20lb bombs, strafed the fleeing Dervishes and
photographed the results. The first
bomb scored a direct hit on a group of Dervishes under a white canopy.
The Mullah’s sister, his uncle Amir Hassan and an escort of 10 riflemen
were all killed. Only the Mullah
escaped unwounded. The blast had
scorched his white robes and green turban.
Over the next few days the DH9As dropped 112lb bombs and 50lb
incendiaries as well as the smaller 20lb bombs forcing the Mullah to retreat
from their caves to the fort at Taleh.
The Haroun was set on fire and
the livestock scattered. Subsequent
raids with bombing from 800 feet and machine gunning from 300 feet completed the
dispersal. The aircraft in these
raids had been spotted and were “identified” as Ottoman Turkish machines
bringing the Sultan’s greetings.
Apparently, the Somalis did not know that the Great War had ended.
These air raids were quickly followed up on the ground.
The Camel Corps (with the camel-pack wireless telegraphy set and a
section of the field hospital) under Colonel Summers moved forward and occupied
Eil Afeweina early on 21 January.
Here he constructed a fortified position and emergency landing strip.
The Illalo scouts pushed further out as a screen and the mounted men
stood to awaiting the call to move immediately as the infantry and baggage
column moved up. The base was
established and, leaving a garrison of 1½ Companies of the 101st
Grenadiers (130 rifles) and a reserve of 1,700 baggage camels, Force A advanced.
Thus a vital supply line to the south that proved of immense value in
later operations was opened. At the
same time a supply column of 1800 camels carrying 3-weeks rations, reserve
Stokes and rifle ammunition, hand grenades and explosives escorted by a company
of 101st Grenadiers and a dismounted company of the Camel Corps
followed close behind. By the 25th
no contact had been made with any large bodies of Dervishes.
The communication by wireless telegraphy and air dropped messages were
both significant because they provided the column commander with up to date
information allowing him an unprecedented operational advantage over previous
commanders and the Mullah.
Arrangements were made by radio for the RAF to bomb the fort
at Jidali at 1000 on 27 January. Most of
the Dervish defenders fled into the bush.
The few that remained held their positions and the Camel Corps was
ordered forward at 1100. As they
advanced the Dervishes fired from the top of the fort but were suppressed by
machine gun fire. The Stokes
mortars were brought forward to 250 yards and then to 180 yards dropping about
20 mortar bombs onto the roof. Some
of these failed to detonate but 4 breached the roof and detonated inside. The
garrison suffered fewer casualties than might have been expected because of the
thick walls and small rooms on the ground floor.
The Dervishes still held out firing and singing and the Camel Corps fell
back to await the reserve ammunition and grenades and for the infantry to launch
a dismounted attack. The next
morning the defenders had fled leaving 2 dead and 76 rifles behind.
Force B, meanwhile, sent out a column led by Lt Col JS
Wilkinson of 667 rifles of the KAR and 63 Illalos from Musha Aled on 20 January.
The column was preceded by an Illalo patrol and a detachment of 1 platoon
of KAR sent to guard a waterhole he intended for use later.
They arrived at Baran after a hard march at 0830 on 23 January.
The fort itself was a square building about 40 feet high with towers at
each corner linked by a 12 foot high wall and was held by about 100 warriors.
Lt Col Wilkinson’s Column
British Officers – 24
British OR - 7
Illalo Scouts (Tribal Police) – 60
6/KAR – 700
800 camels
? x Vickers MMG
? x Lewis LMG
2 x Stokes Mortars |
Captain Hewett’s Landing Party
Sailors – 99
Somali Levy – 149
2 x Tripod Maxim MMG
3 x Lewis LMG
1 x 12 pdr 4 cwt Naval field gun |
Force Z - Gp Capt R Gordon
At Eil Dur Elan
6 x Airco DH9A bombers
2 x Airco DH9A ambulances
6 x spare Airco DH9A bombers |
Force A – Col GH Summers At Eil Dur Elan
Somali Camel Corps – 700
(3 x Camel and 2 x pony Coys with 2 x Stokes Mortars, 8 x Vickers MMG
and 2 x Lewis guns)
101st Bombay Grenadiers – 400
(2 Stokes mortars and 8 Lewis guns)
Ilalos – 300
Field Ambulance – tent section and bearer section
Royal Signals – ½ Kilowatt portable camel-pack wireless set |
Force B – Lt Col JS Wilkinson
At Las Koreh
770 men from:
1/KAR (HQ & No2 Coy)
6/KAR (Nos 1, 2 & 3 Coys)
Naval Detachment from gunboats
Clio & Odin
Illalo
Scouts – 300
Tribal Levy – 3,000 |
The assault formed up in a line of platoons and advanced to 1,200 yards distance
from the fort. The main attack went
in with one company moving around the eastern flank of the fort to cut off any
Dervish retreat. When these troops
were within 600 yards of the Dervishes they opened an enfilade fire but they
were quickly suppressed by machine gun fire.
This allowed the Stokes mortars to be brought up to 500 yards to support
the attack as it moved up to 300 yards.
The Stokes mortar fire appeared to be ineffective although many direct
hits were scored on the roofs of the towers.
At 1630 two courses of action were open to the column; a costly frontal
assault on the fort, or continue the fire fight until evening and then withdraw
to resume the following day. Colonel Wilkinson decided upon the second course of
action. The troops withdrew 4 miles
south of Baran for the night.
The
action opened the next day at 1430 and during the advance the Dervishes kept up
a brisk fire. The Stokes mortars
were brought up to 270 yards and 12 direct hits were scored on the roofs of the
towers behind the parapets. Despite
the heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire the Dervishes held out and it was
decided to assault the fort after dark, breaching it with 100 pounds of
guncotton. Charges were prepared
and ay 1945, Lietenant Godfrey and Quartermaster-Sergeant Wood and 4 KAR Askaris
moved forward under cover of supporting machine gun fire.
They set the charges and tamped them against a corner tower.
There was a terrific explosion that virtually demolished the tower and it
was decided to wait until dawn to make the final assault.
The Dervishes spent the night awaiting the attack.
In the early morning a strong patrol led by Lieutenant Minnery caught the
Dervishes attempting to withdraw and after a quick assault through the ruined
tower he opened the gate and captured 2 more corner towers in short hand-to-hand
fights. The fourth was held by a
resolute sniper who resisted gunfire and grenades until Lieutenant Minnery
climbed up inside it and shot him with his revolver.
Only 10 or 12 of the Dervishes escaped.
The capture of the fort at Baran closed off the Mullah’s route to the
east.
Once the fighting was over the attackers could see the effect
that the mortars and breaching charge had had.
The fort contained 60 bodies and many animals lay dead within the walls.
The attackers had suffered 4 men and a mule wounded.
For their gallantry Minnery was awarded the MC and Wood the DCM.
Despite these successes at Baran, Jidali and Medishe the
whereabouts of the Mullah and his main force was still very obscure.
Intelligence suggested that he and his scattered forces had withdrawn
into the hills to the north. His
actual location was unknown as no prisoners or deserters had yet been brought
in. Air reconnaissance missions
were flown every day and daily updates were communicated by wireless to the
columns. Illalo mobile and standing
patrols were established to report any Dervish movement south from the Surud and
Dalau Range. The RAF operated an
unrestricted campaign bombing and strafing anything that moved while the Illalos
sent out patrols to gather intelligence about the Mullah and the location of his
forces. One of these patrols
discovered a large force of riflemen at a waterhole.
However, the outnumbered Camel Corps troopers were forced to retire but
not before they saw a group of men hustle a stout gentleman off on a mule.
They did not know it at the time but they had spotted the Mullah.
Pending some substantial information, Colonel Summers held his mounted
troops rested. He decided not to
advance on Medishe, the last known site of the
Haroun.
Then on 30 January a deserter came in with news that the
Mullah had broken out and was heading to the Nogal Valley.
Furthermore he had been in the Mullah’s force at 1530 the previous day
and could show the tracks of the Mullah’s Dervish horsemen.
Orders were sent immediately for Force B in its entirety to move to
Jidali and continue operations in the Medishe-Surud area.
The mounted troops of Force A prepared to move out in pursuit.
The deserter also reported, and his story was confirmed later, that the
Mullah had been taken completely by surprise by the advance and after the first
aerial attack he had hidden in a cave at Hamas.
He then moved 15 miles north east of Medishe again hiding in caves.
Here he left his 2 machine guns, arms, ammunition and treasure.
He hid there until he heard of the occupation of Jidali and the capture
of Baran. This compelled him to
flee southwards. It was now clear
that the entire Dervish force was streaming to the Nogal in an evacuation of
everyone and all the livestock supervised by Ibrahim Boghol, one of the best
known Dervish leaders. The deserter
estimated the fighting strength at 700 rifle armed Dervishes and many more
followers of negligible fighting value.
The camel Corps took up the pursuit at 1800 on 30 January.
That night they crossed the Mullah’s tracks and a mounted patrol was sent
to follow them while the remainder attempted to move on and get between him and
the Nogal. The next day small
parties of Dervishes driving their herds and flocks could be seen in all
directions. With the expenditure of
a few shots the camels, goats, sheep and cattle as well as some ponies were
rounded up. To prevent he captured
stock delaying the pursuit Colonel Summers handed them over to the Illalos and
after a short rest the pursuit continued.
The expectation was that once the camel corps got ahead of the Mullah and
cut him off all of his and the Dervish property would fall into the hands of the
friendly tribes.
Aircraft found a party of horsemen escorting the Mullah’s
personal baggage and fast moving livestock.
These they bombed and strafed from 100 feet.
The Camel Corps rode 70 miles in 30 hours to Eil Afweina where they
replenished supplies and moved out the next morning.
Colonel Summers, himself, remained in Eil Afweina to organise a light
supply column to follow up his main body.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Ismay continued the pursuit covering 150
miles in 72 hours. Now they needed
a rest.
Meanwhile in the south and south west the Somali tribal
levy occupied the wells that lay along the routes that the Mullah might use to
escape to Abyssinia. The Mullah’s
options were fast being reduced.
With the news that the Mullah was moving southwards Group
Captain Gordon commissioned Eil Afweina as an advanced base for air operations.
On 1 February, an aerial reconnaissance was flown to Taleh which was
found and bombed. The aircraft also
took valuable photographs that showed Taleh was a formidable and strongly
fortified position with a walled enclosure in which there were 13 forts with
three more 200 yards outside. These
latter were very strong and high.
Once Taleh was captured the forts were found to be of very strongly built
stone-work. The walls were 12-14
feet thick at the base and 6 feet wide at the top.
The outer three forts were not less than 50-60 feet tall.
Inside the walled enclosure (the “silsillat”
or “the chain”) were wells and room for several hundred animals.
Numerous stone granaries well filled with
jowari (sorghum) were set into the
walls. The fortifications had taken
some 12 years and a huge amount of labour for his Dervish followers to
construct. They were designed and
the labour was supervised by Arab masons from the Yemen.
By means of the daily reconnaissance aircraft letters in
Arabic from the Governor of British Somaliland, GF Archer, were delivered on 1
February to the Somali leaders warning them that the Mullah was fleeing towards
Taleh and asking them to keep a close watch for him.
On 2 February the aircraft delivered orders to Captain Alan Gibb, at the
Somali Levy Headquarters instructing him to make contact with the Somali Camel
Corps and proceed to Taleh.
Now that the tribal friendlies were out hunting down the Dervishes the RAF were
ordered to cease bombing operations because it was impossible to distinguish
between friend and foe. On 4
February the RAF sent out 3 bombers to raid Taleh.
This raid scored 3 direct hits with 112 pounders and four with 20 pound
bombs on the main position and a 20 pounder was dropped on the Mullah’s own fort
but without doing it any significant damage.
The aircraft the carried out a strafing attack and dropping incendiaries
set fire to the huts inside and around the fortifications.
They also destroyed part of the
Haroun. Unfortunately the radio
set with the Camel Corps broke down and the RAF delivered the messages from then
on.
On 4 February a few tribal horsemen reported to Captain Gibb
that the Mullah was in Taleh. He
had been followed by some 60 horsemen.
By now Captain Gibb had made contact with the Camel Corps and he went to
join them with every available tribal rifleman.
Further information confused the situation and cast doubt as to whether
the Mullah was in Taleh. Akil
tribesmen reported that more Dervishes were arriving at Taleh while others
reported that the tribal leaders were convinced that the Mullah was in the fort
and the whole Dervish force was moving to Taleh.
On 5 February, the Tribal Levy fought with a large force of Dervishes
escorting the Mullah’s main caravan.
Amongst the Dervishes killed were Haji Sudi (an ex-naval interpreter),
Ibrahim Boghol and other leaders and the captures included 1,400 camels, 450
cows, 50 ponies, 51 rifles and 2,000 rounds of ammunition and 300 camel loads of
supplies. Amongst the personal
belongings of the Mullah that were captured were his correspondence, clothing
and silver jewellery. Only a few
escaped to the fort.
Then on 8 February it was discovered from informers that the Mullah was indeed
at Taleh where he was besieged by 200 levies and also that he intended to break
out that very night. On the next
morning the Mullah’s second son, Abdul Rahman Jahid, and his uncle Haji Osman
were brought in to the Camel Corps zeriba.
They said that the Mullah had intended to leave the previous night but
the presence of the 200 Levies had deterred him but that he was going to leave
that night. Immediately after a
conference with Ismay, and without waiting for the Camel Corps, Gibb set off at
a cracking pace with his 800 men.
The Camel Corps had only 2 days rations left and a supply column had to be
organised to follow them. Gibb
arrived the next afternoon just too late to prevent the escape of the Mullah.
As he arrived at 1730 he heard heavy firing and as he came in sight of
the fortifications he could see the Dervishes running back inside while a party
of mounted men rode north. The
Mullah had launched a sortie with the garrison to drive back the Levy screen
allowing him to break out with an escort of 80 mounted men.
Word was sent to the mounted column, the dust of which was already
visible. Gibb had no mounted men
and could not pursue on foot and so he approached the forts and found them
lightly held. He attacked at once
and a general panic ensued with men women and children rushing out of the forts.
The remaining 150 or so Dervishes in Taleh put up little resistance and
in an hour the Levies captured 40 Dervishes, 4 Arab stonemasons, 600 rifles, 450
camels, 40 ponies and the Mullah’s Turkish advisor, Mohammed Ali as well as
hundreds of Dervish women and children.
A few Dervish riflemen fought on alone or in little groups and were
either killed or escaped during the night.
One party held on in the immensely strong Taleh fort throwing back two
assaults in the night. In the
morning they were granted terms and they opened the door and surrendered.
Captain (acting Lieutenant Colonel) HL Ismay and the Camel
Corps caught up with Gibb at Taleh just after dark that same evening.
Right away he sent out a strong patrol to try to find the Mullah’s trail.
However, they failed to do so in the dark and on the hard ground.
Nevertheless he pressed on at dawn on 10 February.
The trail split and rejoined several times.
Well before dawn on 11 February he sent back all but the fittest animals
reducing his force to 150 rifles, 3 machine guns and 2 Stokes mortars.
At 1545 he captured a Dervish picket who gave out the information that
the Mullah and his escorting horsemen were now only a mile ahead watering at
Bihen Nullah. They caught up with
them and in a short action killed 44 including some of the Mullah’s relatives
and taking 5 of the Mullah’s wives and 9 of his children.
The following morning, near Gerrowei, Ismay caught up with a party of
Dervishes. Leaving 20 men to guard the prisoners, Ismay gave chase and caught
them in the broken ground northwest of the Gerrowei stream.
C Company (pony mounted) galloped straight through the Dervish foot
warriors holding a narrow neck and joining up with another patrol at Gerrowei
continuing in pursuit of the Dervish horsemen.
The horsemen were soon run down and only a few escaped on foot while the
footmen at the neck were overrun and most were killed.
Reports on the exact location of the Mullah were conflicting
and when a trail of horse, foot and camels was found to the south heading into
the Haud, Ismay gave chase in the hope that it was the Mullah.
This time he took only 20 men on ponies and a camel troop.
These were the only ponies that could raise a speed better than a walk!
The Dervishes turned out to be a group under the Abyssinian Fitaurari
(Commander of the Vanguard – a military title) Bayenna who had been a Dervish
supporter for some years. A short
action took place and 8 Dervishes were killed and 2 captured.
What Ismay did not know was how close he was to the Mullah who was
watching from a nearby hill. With
their mounts spent, Ismay’s troops regrouped at Gerrowei.
Again the Mullah had narrowly escaped his pursuers but at some personal
cost. Some 60 of his personal
following had been killed including seven of his sons and seven other close
relatives; also four of his kasoosi
(immediate advisers and leaders).
Six more of his sons, his five remaining wives, four daughters and two sisters
had been captured and only his eldest son, Mahdi, a brother and three or four
well known Dervishes had escaped.
His entire party was now reduced to a group of ten hunted men.
The Mullah avoided waterholes, sending the ponies in to be watered under
escort and changing location while they were away in case the escort was
captured and gave away his position.
In this way he escaped across the Haud into Abyssinian territory.
The campaign came to a close with a few delaying and
rearguard actions by the Dervishes trying to hold back the pursuers.
By the Middle of April the Dervishes were dispersed and though the Mullah
was still at large the British were able to call the Fifth Expedition a success
for the cost of 4 men killed, 11 wounded and 13 died of sickness.
Even so there was one last battle in late July in the Ogaden
west of Shinileh. Here 3,000
tribesmem loyal to the British cause led by Haji Waraba found and attacked 800
Dervishes remaining with the Mullah.
However, the Mullah once more escaped and led his 400 surviving followers
deeper into Abyssinian territory.
Once there, he set about constructing a perimeter of 13 forts and offered peace
negotiations with the Abyssinians.
The negotiations dragged on and the Mullah fell ill, apparently from influenza.
After six days sickness he died on 23 November 1920 a victim of the world
wide pandemic. When he died he was
far from his tribal homeland. In
the end the fanaticism of his followers had evaporated in the face of modern
weaponry and tactics and his tribal forces with their guerrilla tactics no
longer matched the pace of modern joint warfare in three dimensions.
An outstanding feature of this expedition was the sustained and determined pursuit by the Camel Corps, who were often on half or no rations, over a great stretch of inhospitable terrain regardless of privation or fatigue. The pursuit was pressed to the utmost limits of man and beast to bring success. A second feature was the performance of the largely untrained levy. This reflected the 6 years of effort given by the local administration to the building up of the power of the local leaders.
Fifth Expedition - Composition
Force Z:
This was the crucial force within the plan to subdue the Mullah.
It arrived from Britain on HMS Ark Royal under the command of
Group-Captain R Gordon. It
comprised an air striking force of Airco DH9A light bombers and two more fitted
out as air ambulances. The landing
ground selected was at Eil Dur Elan where 36 RAF officers and 189 Other Ranks,
including medical, servicing, stores and ammunition sections was assembled to
maintain the air operation. The
DH9As were able to carry a maximum bomb load of
660lbs made up of high explosive bombs of 20lb and 112lb or
incendiaries up to 50lb capacity as well as their fitted armament of a
forward firing Vickers machine gun and one or two Lewis guns in the rear
cockpit.
Force A: The main regular force was
commanded by Colonel GH Summers ably assisted by Captain (acting Lieutenant
Colonel) GF Ismay. It provided the
main ground striking force and the majority of the security for bases and the
line of communication. The wireless
telegraph set with its speed in two-way communications proved to be a vital
asset. When it eventually broke
down the RAF was able to make up for its loss by instituting a daily message and
despatch service.
Force B: The main body of the
Somali tribal levy was commanded by Captain Alan Gibb with Rissaldar Major Musa
Farah as his second in command. The
levy was to work in close support of the Camel Corps and the three companies of
6/KAR. These companies had been
recruited in Tanganyika at the end of WW1 from unemployed German
Schutztruppe askaris.
The illalos (tribal police)
were very valuable as scouts and intelligence gatherers.
They were organised in patrols of 10-25 men.
These patrols transmitted information on the Dervish movements by radio
to the nearest garrison.